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The Original Understanding of the New Hampshire 
Constitution’s Education Clause 
EDWARD C. MOSCA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1993, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that “part II, article 
83 [of the state constitution] imposes a duty on the State to provide a con-
stitutionally adequate education to every educable child in the public 
schools in New Hampshire and to guarantee adequate funding,”1 and that 
this duty is enforceable by the judiciary.2  This decision, known as Clare-
mont I, was the wellspring of a line of decisions that has radically changed 
both the manner in which public education is funded in New Hampshire 
and the respective roles of the judicial branch and the representative 
branches in formulating education policy.3 
Since the adoption of the state constitution in 1784, public education in 
New Hampshire had been funded primarily with local taxes.4  The Clare-
  
 * Attorney in private practice.  Mr. Mosca has a special interest in constitutional law. 
 1. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 635 A.2d 1375, 1376 (N.H. 1993). 
 2. Id. at 1381 (“Having identified that a duty exists and having suggested the nature of that duty, 
we emphasize the corresponding right of the citizens to its enforcement.”). 
 3. I will refer to these decisions as the Claremont decisions or the Claremont case, even though the 
latest decision does not contain “Claremont” in the caption.  See Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU # 12 v. 
State (Londonderry I), 907 A.2d 988 (N.H. 2006).  The supreme court has referred to the first two 
decisions as Claremont I and Claremont II.  In Claremont II, which I will discuss in more detail later, 
the court struck down the definition of an adequate education developed in response to Claremont I.  
See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1357–58 (N.H. 1997).  Clare-
mont II declared an adequate education a fundamental right, id. at 1359, ruled the funding system was 
unconstitutional, id. at 1357, and set a deadline for the legislature to implement a new funding system, 
id. at 1360.  Commentators have referred to a decision issued in 2002, Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Gover-
nor (Claremont III), 794 A.2d 744 (N.H. 2002), which held that the state’s duty to provide an adequate 
education required “standards of accountability,” as Claremont III.  See, e.g., John Dayton & Anne 
Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the War?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2395 (2004).  
By my count, the court has, so far, issued fourteen Claremont decisions.  See Edward C. Mosca, New 
Hampshire’s Claremont Case and the Separation of Powers, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 409, n.1 (2006) (synop-
sizing Claremont decisions). 
 4. Under a law passed in 1789, which remained in effect until 1919, the legislature set a total 
amount to be spent annually on all common schools.  To raise that sum, each town or other taxable 
place was required to collect from its taxpayers an amount equivalent to its percentage of the state’s tax 
base multiplied by the total amount of spending.  For example, if the total amount of spending was set 
at $10,000 and a town’s tax base was two percent of the state’s tax base, that town had to collect $200.  
However, all of the taxes raised in a town or taxable place were then spent on its own schools; that is, 
there was no revenue redistribution by the state.  See, e.g., WALTER A. BACKOFEN, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
ON BEHALF OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW HAMPSHIRE: THE COURT AS HISTORIAN AND LAWMAKER 
10–11 (2000).  While later laws introduced state aid, the majority of the funding remained local.  See 
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mont decisions flatly rejected this long tradition of local control of the 
funding of public education: “Whatever the State identifies as comprising 
constitutional adequacy it must pay for.  None of that financial obligation 
can be shifted to local school districts, regardless of their relative wealth or 
need.”5   
The Claremont decisions also flatly rejected the longstanding judicial 
construction of Part II, Article 83 as allowing the legislature to exercise 
plenary control over education policy.6  Instead, notwithstanding the sepa-
ration of powers principle set forth in Part I, Article 377 and the constitu-
tion’s explicit commitment of the powers to make laws,8 raise taxes,9 and 
spend money10 to the representative branches, Article 83 has become the 
source of “mandates,” which are to be declared by the judiciary and im-
plemented by the representative branches.11  Moreover, the court, in its 
most recent decision, Londonderry I, announced the power to effectuate 
these mandates itself.12  
  
DOUGLAS E. HALL, LESSONS FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE: WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM THE HISTORY OF 
THE STATE’S ROLE IN SCHOOL FINANCE 1642-1998, at 2 (1998), available at http://www.nhpolicy.org/ 
education/history1.html.  When the court struck down the state’s education funding system in 1997, 
“[l]ocally raised real property taxes [we]re the principal source of revenue for public schools, providing 
on average from seventy-four to eighty-nine percent of total school revenue.”  Claremont II, 703 A.2d 
at 1354. 
 5. Londonderry I, 907 A.2d at 995.  Following Claremont II, the legislature set the cost of an 
adequate education at $825 million, see Sirrell v. State, 780 A.2d 494, 497 (N.H. 2001), which was 
approximately fifty-five percent of total education spending.  See N.H. DEPT. OF EDUC., STATE 
SUMMARY REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS 1999–2000 (2003), http://www.ed. 
state.nh.us/education/data/ReportsandStatistics/FinancialReports/SummaryRevenueExpenses/Summary 
RevenueExpenses1999-2000/SummaryRevExp1999-2000.htm. 
 6. See, e.g., City of Franklin v. Hinds, 143 A.2d 111, 113 (N.H. 1958) (“The manner in which 
educational policy of cities shall be formulated is determined by the Legislature and not the courts.”); 
Amyot v. Caron, 190 A. 134, 139 (N.H. 1937) (“[T]he unrestricted legislative control is not doubt-
ful.”); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111, 137 (1817) (“I am aware that this power of 
the hands of the legislature may, like every other power, at times be unwisely exercised; but where can 
it be more securely lodged?  If those whom the people annually elect to manage their public affairs, 
cannot be trusted, who can?  The people have most emphatically enjoined it in the constitution, as a 
duty upon ‘the legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of the government, to cherish the inter-
ests of literature and the sciences and all seminaries and public schools.’”). 
 7. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 37. 
 8. N.H. CONST. pt. II, arts. 2, 5. 
 9. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 28, pt. II, art. 5. 
 10. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 56. 
 11. See Londonderry I, 907 A.2d 988, 990 (N.H. 2006) (Claremont II “issued ‘four mandates: define 
an adequate education, determine the cost, fund it with constitutional taxes, and ensure its delivery 
through accountability’”). 
 12. After holding that “the current education funding and ‘definitional’ statutory framework falls 
well short of the constitutional requirements established in this court’s Claremont decisions,” the court 
went on to set a deadline for the representative branches to “define with specificity the components of a 
constitutionally adequate education,” and threatened that “[s]hould they fail to do so, we will then be 
required to take further action to enforce the mandates of Part II, Article 83.”  Id. at 995. 
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Given the Claremont cases’ sweeping rejection of longstanding gov-
ernmental practice, its radical deviation from the court’s own precedents 
and the obvious separation of powers issues raised by a judicially enforce-
able duty to provide and fund an adequate education, Claremont’s constitu-
tional pedigree should be a matter of substantial importance.  The court, in 
Claremont I, based its interpretation of Article 83 on the original under-
standing.13  This article will examine whether the court’s Claremont juris-
prudence actually comports with the original understanding.   
This article will begin by reviewing the gloss that subsequent Clare-
mont decisions have placed on Claremont I’s holdings, in order to have a 
complete basis to compare the court’s Claremont jurisprudence to the 
original understanding.  Next, this article will examine the original under-
standing of Article 83.  As part of this examination, I will discuss and cri-
tique the court’s analysis of, and conclusions about the original under-
standing.  My conclusion is that we can be quite certain that the voters who 
adopted Article 83 did not understand it to impose the sort of duty to pro-
vide and fund an adequate education that has been fashioned in the Clare-
mont decisions.  This article will finish by examining whether Claremont 
should be preserved on account of stare decisis.  My conclusion in this 
regard is that the benefits of overruling Claremont overwhelmingly out-
weigh any costs.   
II.  A SYNOPSIS OF THE CLAREMONT DECISIONS 
In Claremont I, which was issued in 1993, the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court held that “part II, article 83 [of the state constitution] imposes 
a duty on the State to provide a constitutionally adequate education to 
  
 13. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 635 A.2d 1375, 1377–78 (N.H. 1993) (“In 
interpreting an article in our constitution, we will give the words the same meaning that they must have 
had to the electorate on the date the vote was cast.  In doing so, we must place ourselves as nearly as 
possible in the situation of the parties at the time the instrument was made, that we may gather their 
intention from the language used, viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances.”).  Claremont I 
is the only decision in the Claremont cases that attempts to justify the notion of a duty to provide an 
adequate education.  Subsequent Claremont decisions mention neither historical evidence nor pre-
Claremont precedent, but cite only prior Claremont decisions, see, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Gover-
nor (Claremont III), 794 A.2d 744, 760 (N.H. 2002) (“[I]n the nearly nine years since this court issued 
the decision in Claremont I, we have rendered eight subsequent opinions directly related to that initial 
decision.  In each of these decisions, this court considered whether the actions of the State conformed to 
the governing constitutional principles expressed in Claremont I and Claremont II.”), and breezily 
dismiss charges that the court was setting education policy.  See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor 
(Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1360 (N.H. 1997) (“We agree with [dissenting] Justice Horton that we 
were not appointed to establish education policy . . . . That is why we leave such matters . . . to the two 
co-equal branches of government”); Claremont III, 794 A.2d at 760 (“We recognize that we are not 
appointed to establish educational policy and have not done so today.”) 
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every educable child in the public schools in New Hampshire and to guar-
antee adequate funding.”14  The court also held that this duty is judicially 
enforceable: “[W]e emphasize the corresponding right of the citizens to 
[the duty’s] enforcement. . . . Any citizen has standing to enforce this 
right,”15 which the court described as “an important substantive right.”16   
However, the court did not “define the parameters of the education 
mandated by the constitution as that task is, in the first instance, for the 
legislature and the Governor.”17  Thus, Claremont I implied that the court 
would leave the making of education policy primarily to the representative 
branches. 
Following remand and a “trial on the merits,”18 the trial court “ruled in 
a detailed and thoughtful opinion” that “the education provided in the 
plaintiff school districts is constitutionally adequate” and that “the New 
Hampshire system of funding public elementary and secondary education 
guarantees constitutionally adequate funding to each of the plaintiff school 
districts.”19  The case was then re-appealed and, in 1997, the court issued 
Claremont II. 
In Claremont II, the court decided that defining the parameters of edu-
cational adequacy was not a task for the representative branches after all.  
The court struck down a definition of educational adequacy developed by 
the State Board of Education20 and said that it would “look to the seven 
criteria articulated by the Supreme Court of Kentucky as establishing gen-
eral, aspirational guidelines for defining educational adequacy.”21  These 
“general, aspirational guidelines” are: 
  
 14. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1376. 
 15. Id. at 1381. 
 16. Id.  Under state equal protection analysis, a “substantive” right triggers a lower level of scrutiny 
than a “fundamental” right.  See In re Sandra H., 846 A.2d 513, 517 (N.H. 2004) (classifications in-
volving a fundamental right “must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be 
necessary to the accomplishment of its legitimate purpose,” while classifications involving an impor-
tant substantive right “must be reasonable and rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and 
substantial relation to the object of the legislation”). 
 17. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1381. 
 18. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1354. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1357–58.  The ground given by the court for striking down the state board’s definition—
that the duty of defining an adequate education was non-delegable—is specious.  It makes no sense that 
the constitution would allow the legislature to delegate the task of providing an adequate education, see 
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont III), 794 A.2d 744, 755 (N.H. 2002), but not defining it.  
Also, if the problem was simply that the task of defining adequacy could not be delegated, then there 
was no reason for the court to have gone on to adopt the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s so-called “gen-
eral, aspirational guidelines for defining educational adequacy.”  See Mosca, supra note 3, at 421. 
 21. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359.  The Kentucky decision, Rose v. Council for Better Education, 
790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), is one of the cases that marked the beginning of the so-called “third wave” 
of education funding litigation, which is distinguished by the use of the education clauses of state 
constitutions, rather than state equal protection clauses, to challenge a state’s system of financing 
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(1) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable 
students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civiliza-
tion; 
(2) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political sys-
tems to enable the student to make informed choices; 
(3) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to en-
able the student to understand the issues that affect his or her 
community, state, and nation; 
(4) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her men-
tal and physical wellness; 
(5) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to 
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; 
(6) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in 
either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to 
choose and pursue life work intelligently; and  
(7) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable 
public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts 
in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.22 
The court added that it anticipated that the representative branches 
would “promptly develop and adopt specific criteria implementing these 
guidelines.”23  Thus, the duty of the representative branches had been re-
duced from defining the parameters of an adequate education to designing 
and implementing a program of public education based on the court’s pa-
rameters.24  
The court in Claremont II also changed the nature of the funding duty.  
Rather than acting as a guarantor of adequate funding, the State henceforth 
would be the exclusive provider of this funding as the court held that local 
property taxes could not be used to pay for any portion of the cost of an 
  
public education.  See Mosca, supra note 3, at 411–14 (discussing three waves of education funding 
litigation). 
 22. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Compare Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993) 
(holding it was a task for the legislature and the governor to define the parameters of the education 
mandated by the constitution), with Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359 (anticipating that the legislature 
will promptly develop and implement the guidelines).  Justice Horton, who had been part of the unani-
mous Claremont I decision, dissented, reasoning as follows: “My problem is that I was not appointed to 
establish educational policy.”  Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1361 (Horton, J., dissenting).  It is perhaps 
revealing of the mindset of the court that Horton described the purpose of his dissent as “explain[ing] to 
the students and taxpayers of this State why I am unable to effect needed reform.”  Id. 
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adequate education: “To the extent that the property tax is used in the fu-
ture to fund the provision of an adequate education, the tax must be admin-
istered in a manner that is equal in valuation and uniform in rate through-
out the State.”25  It also set a deadline for the representative branches to 
replace the extant funding system, which relied heavily on the local prop-
erty tax.26 
The court in Claremont II also elevated the constitutional right to an 
adequate education from an “important, substantive right”27 to a “funda-
mental right.”28  While the court “agree[d] with those who say that merely 
spending additional money on education will not necessarily insure its 
quality,”29 it saw it as “basic” that the State must assure “comparable fund-
ing.”30  Thus, the duty to guarantee adequate funding had come to mean 
that the cost of an adequate education must be based on comparable per-
pupil spending and that all of this cost must be funded with state taxes. 
In 2002, the court held that “standards of accountability are an essen-
tial component of the State’s duty to provide a constitutionally adequate 
education”:31 
  
 25. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1357.  Dissenting Justice Horton pointed out that the majority’s 
treatment of education funding was anomalous because “[p]olitical subdivisions, at their own expense, 
carry out state duties on elections, fire and police protection, land use control and other exercises of the 
police power, provisions of highways, sanitation and the structure of staffing and local government.”  
Id. at 1363 (Horton, J., dissenting). 
 26. Id. at 1360 (“[T]he present funding system may remain in effect throughout the 1998 tax year.”).  
At the time, “[l]ocally raised real property taxes [were] the principal source of revenue for public 
schools, providing on average from seventy-four to eighty-nine percent of total school revenue.”  Id. at 
1354. 
 27. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1381. 
 28. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359.  Claremont II does not attempt to explain how, in the four years 
between Claremont I and Claremont II, the right to an education grew from a substantive right to a 
fundamental right. 
 29. Id. at 1360. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont III), 794 A.2d 744, 752 (N.H. 2002).  In the 
interim, the court had issued an additional eight Claremont decisions.  In 1998, the court rejected a 
challenge to Justice Batchelder’s participation in Claremont II, Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 712 
A.2d 612, 614–15 (N.H. 1998), issued an advisory opinion rejecting former Governor Shaheen’s 
“ABC” education funding plan, Opinion of the Justices (School Financing), 712 A.2d 1080 (N.H. 
1998), and denied the state’s request for an extension to implement a new education funding system, 
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 725 A.2d 648, 651–52 (N.H. 1998).  The court was just as busy in 
1999, issuing an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of a proposed tax plan referendum, Opinion 
of the Justices (Tax Plan Referendum), 725 A.2d 1082 (N.H. 1999), granting the Claremont plaintiffs’ 
challenge to a “phase-in” in certain communities of a state property tax to fund public education, 
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 744 A.2d 1107, 1112–13 (N.H. 1999), and granting the Claremont 
plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees, Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 761 A.2d 389, 394 (N.H 
1999).  In 2000, the state senate requested an advisory opinion upon the constitutionality of a “targeted 
aid” education funding system, which defined the cost of an adequate education, but partially funded 
that cost with local property taxes.  In Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Public School Financing 
System), 765 A.2d 673 (N.H. 2000), the court confirmed the change in the nature of the state’s funding 
duty from guarantor to provider, opining that the proposed legislation would “directly contradict the 
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Accountability means that the state must provide a definition of a 
constitutionally adequate education, the definition must have stan-
dards, and the standards must be subject to meaningful application 
so that it is possible to determine whether, in delegating its obliga-
tion to provide a constitutionally adequate education, the state has 
fulfilled its duty.32 
  
mandate of Part II, Article 83,” id. at 676, because “its proposed funding mechanism would rely, in 
part, upon local property taxes to pay for some of the cost of an adequate education.”  Id.  And, appar-
ently in case that was not clear enough, the court “reiterated” that one of the “core holdings from earlier 
Claremont decisions” was: “the New Hampshire Constitution imposes solely upon the state the obliga-
tion to provide sufficient funds for each school district to furnish a constitutionally adequate education 
to every educable child.”  Id. at 677.  The court also “reiterated,” quite gratuitously because the issue 
was not before it, that educational adequacy had “yet to be defined.”  Id.  This was despite the enact-
ment of RSA 193-E:2 in 1998, which essentially codified the “general, aspirational guidelines” handed 
down in Claremont II.  See 1998 N.H. Laws 548 (Chapter 389:1).  The court added, despite the legisla-
tive determination in the proposed law in issue that an adequate education cost $900,000,000, that “[i]t 
is not possible to determine the level of funding required to provide the children of this State with a 
constitutionally adequate education until its essential elements have been identified and defined.”  
Opinion of the Justices, 765 A.2d at 677.  And, in 2001, by a mere one vote majority, the court upheld 
the constitutionality of the state property tax.  See Sirrell v. State, 780 A.2d 494, 504 (N.H. 2001). 
 32. Claremont III, 794 A.2d at 751.  The court reasoned that “[i]f the State cannot be held account-
able for fulfilling its duty, the duty creates no obligation and is no longer a duty.”  Id.  This reasoning 
ignores that the constitution provides for accountability through the democratic process as all legisla-
tors and the governor must stand for reelection every two years. 
  The court went on to “determine whether the existing statutes, regulations and rules satisfy this 
obligation,” id. at 752, and held that certain education regulations known as the “minimum standards” 
for school approval, see N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. ED. 306.01 (2006), were “in clear conflict with 
the State’s duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education” to the extent they “excuse compliance 
solely based on financial conditions,” Claremont III, 794 A.2d at 755, and to this extent the minimum 
standards were deemed “facially insufficient.”  Id. 
  The court had never before used the phrase “facially insufficient” to describe a law or regula-
tion’s constitutional status.  While it sounds “facially unconstitutional,” it is a completely different 
animal.  A facially unconstitutional challenge to a legislative act is “the most difficult challenge to 
mount successfully,” and to succeed “the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists 
under which the Act would be valid.”  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); State v. 
Brobst, 857 A.2d 1253, 1254–57 (N.H. 2004) (discussing overbreadth doctrine).  “Facial insufficiency” 
appears to mean that the challenger simply must show that the law was not written the way the court 
would have written it. 
  Two of the five justices dissented on separation of powers grounds: 
We believe that by deciding the State is required to set standards that when applied indicate 
whether the school districts are providing an adequate education and hold those school dis-
tricts accountable, the majority moves unnecessarily into the province of the legislative and 
executive branches. . . . Nor should the court sit in continuous judgment over educational 
policy decisions made by the legislature and the [g]overnor, which may very well be a con-
sequence of today’s decision. 
Claremont III, 794 A.2d at 763. 
  The court also was critical of the New Hampshire Education Improvement and Assessment 
Program because the Department of Education “is limited to using the results [of assessment tests] to 
encourage school districts to develop a local education improvement and assessment plan,” which the 
court felt was not a “meaningful” application of assessment tests.  Id. at 758.  Borrowing language that 
had been suggested by the Attorney General, the court “conclud[ed] that the State ‘needs to do more 
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Thus, in less than a decade, Article 83’s charge to the representative 
branches had evolved from defining the parameters of an adequate educa-
tion (Claremont I),33 to “promptly develop[ing] and adopt[ing] specific 
criteria implementing” parameters chosen by the court (Claremont II),34 to 
having to include in the “specific criteria” implementing the court’s pa-
rameters “standards of accountability” that enable judicial oversight of 
public education.35 
In 2006, the court issued Londonderry I,36 which involved a number of 
challenges to a recently passed education funding law, House Bill 616, 
including that it “fail[ed] to define, determine the cost of, and ensure deliv-
ery of a constitutionally adequate education.”37  House Bill 616 involved 
“targeted aid.”38  It repealed a funding law that had provided a base amount 
  
work’ to fulfill its duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education and incorporate meaningful 
accountability in the education system.”  Id. at 759. 
  The Attorney General had taken the position that the respective roles of the branches was that 
the representative branches 
are responsible for crafting and implementing a long-term solution to the problems with the 
education funding system found by this Court.  The Court is responsible for deciding 
whether the legislature has adopted a satisfactory definition and for determining that the leg-
islature has finished its initial tasks under Claremont II, or that it needs to do more work.  
Claremont III, 794 A.2d at 755.  In other words, according to the Attorney General, the supreme 
court’s constitutional role is to tell the legislature how high to jump, while the legislature’s constitu-
tional role is to jump that high. 
 33. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993). 
 34. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997). 
 35. Claremont III, 794 A.2d at 751. 
 36. Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU # 12 v. State (Londonderry I), 907 A.2d 988 (N.H. 2006).  In the 
interim, the court rejected two challenges to the legislative process used to pass a new education fund-
ing law.  See Hughes v. Speaker of N.H. House of Representatives, 876 A.2d 736 (N.H. 2005); Baines 
v. N.H. Senate President, 876 A.2d 768, 784 (N.H. 2005). 
 37. Londonderry I, 907 A.2d at 990.  The challenge to House Bill 616 was based on the concept 
advanced by the Attorney General and accepted by the court, without analysis, that Claremont II im-
posed certain “mandates” on the representative branches: “In [Claremont III], we acknowledged the 
State’s assertion that [Claremont II] issued ‘four mandates: define an adequate education, determine the 
cost, fund it with constitutional taxes, and ensure its delivery through accountability,’ and that these 
four mandates comprise the State's duty to provide an adequate education.”  Id.  The Attorney Gen-
eral’s “assertion” is manifestly wrong, see Mosca, supra note 3, at 417 n.55, and undermines the inter-
ests of the legislature. 
 38. The proposed legislation rejected in Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Public School Financing 
System), 765 A.2d 673, 675 (N.H. 2000), also, as discussed previously, involved “targeted aid.”  How-
ever, unlike that legislation, House Bill 616 did not set forth the cost of an adequate education.  Be-
cause it did not, the court could not declare it unconstitutional on the ground that on its face it did not 
“provide sufficient funds for each school district to furnish a constitutionally adequate education to 
every educable child.”  Id. at 677.  Therefore, the court declined the plaintiffs’ request that it exercise 
its original jurisdiction to review House Bill 616: 
[P]laintiffs . . . filed a petition for declaratory relief in this court in 2005 seeking a determi-
nation that House Bill 616 is unconstitutional.  After considering the parties’ briefs regard-
ing whether we should exercise our original jurisdiction, we concluded that ‘while substan-
tial questions of constitutional law are presented by this case, we believe further factual de-
velopment is necessary in the superior court before those questions are decided.’  Accord-
ingly, the plaintiffs’ action was dismissed without prejudice. 
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of state funding to every school district on an equal per pupil basis and 
then provided additional “targeted aid,” i.e., additional funding that varied 
from town to town.39  Instead, House Bill 616 provided only “targeted aid,” 
which was determined using factors such as property tax base,40 income,41 
and the number of students who were proficient in English.42 
The majority43 reasoned that “the definition of a constitutionally ade-
quate education is essential to all other issues, including the cost of a con-
stitutionally adequate education and the method by which to raise the nec-
essary funds.”44  Accordingly, it “stay[ed] that portion of the case contain-
ing the trial court’s findings that the legislature has failed to determine the 
cost, failed to satisfy the requirement of accountability and established a 
non-uniform tax rate”45 and “retain[ed] jurisdiction with the expectation 
  
Londonderry I, 907 A.2d at 989–90.  The trial court, however, did not conduct a trial to determine 
whether House Bill 616 “provide[ed] sufficient funds for each school district to furnish a constitution-
ally adequate education to every educable child,” Opinion of the Justices, 765 A.2d at 677, but rather 
granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the grounds “that the State has failed to fulfill 
its duty to define a constitutionally adequate education, failed to determine the cost of an adequate 
education, and failed to satisfy the requirement of accountability, and that House Bill 616 (the current 
education funding law) creates a non-uniform tax rate in violation of Part II, Article 5 of the New 
Hampshire Constitution.”  Londonderry I, 907 A.2d at 989.  As the same result could have been ac-
complished at the outset in the supreme court, one wonders whether this is what the court had in mind 
when it sent the case to the superior court. 
 39. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 198:40 (1999 & Supp. 2006) (repealed 2005).  The “targeted aid” 
was based on relative income and property tax base.  2004 N.H. Laws 366–67 (Chapter 200:20).  The 
amount of per-pupil funding in the repealed law was derived from a formula intended to calculate the 
cost of an adequate education.  For the 1999/2000 through the 2002/2003 school years, the amount of 
per-pupil funding was determined based on a cost study.  1999 N.H. Laws 32–33 (Chapter 17:41).  The 
amount of per-pupil funding for the 2003/2004 and 2004/2005 school years was determined by apply-
ing an inflation factor to the cost for the 2002/2003 school year.  2003 N.H. Laws 453 (Chapter 241:4). 
 40. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 198:40-a, 198:40-c (1999 & Supp. 2006). 
 41. Id. § 198:40-b. 
 42. Id. 
 43. The court split over how to review House Bill 616.  Four of the five justices agreed that the 
initial focus should have been on whether the representative branches had defined an adequate educa-
tion, while the fifth, Justice Duggan, believed that the salient issue was whether House Bill 616 funded 
the cost of an adequate education in the plaintiff school districts.  Duggan rejected the majority’s ap-
proach because, “even if the legislature provides a more specific definition of an adequate education, 
that definition is meaningless unless the legislature also determines what that specifically-defined 
education will cost.”  Londonderry I, 907 A.2d at 1001 (Duggan, J., dissenting).  Of the four justices 
who framed the issue as whether the representative branches had defined an adequate education, one, 
Justice Galway, disagreed with the majority over the remedy.  Id. at 1002 (Galway, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. at 995. 
 45. Id.  The trial court’s order was based on the concept that Claremont II imposed certain “man-
dates” upon the representative branches: “In [Claremont III], the Supreme Court adopted the State’s 
assertion that Claremont II issued ‘four mandates: define an adequate education, determine the cost, 
fund it with constitutional taxes, and ensure its delivery through accountability.’  These four mandates 
collectively constitute the State’s duty to provide a constitutionally adequate public education.”  Lon-
donderry Sch. Dist. SAU # 12 v. State, No. 05-E-0406, 2006 WL 563120, at *4 (N.H. Super. Ct. Mar. 
8, 2006).  Similarly, the majority’s analysis of House Bill 616 assumed these mandates: “In [Claremont 
III] we acknowledged the State’s assertion that . . . Claremont II issued ‘four mandates: define an 
adequate education, determine the cost, fund it with constitutional taxes and ensure its delivery through 
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that the political branches will define with specificity the components of a 
constitutionally adequate education before the end of fiscal year 2007.”46 
By “specificity,” the majority meant “sufficiently clear to permit 
common understanding and allow for an objective determination of 
costs.”47  The representative branches could not simply codify the “general, 
aspirational guidelines” issued in Claremont I because that made it “im-
possible for school districts, parents, and courts, not to mention the legisla-
tive and executive branches themselves, to know where the State’s obliga-
tions to fund the cost of a constitutionally adequate education begin and 
end.”48 
If the representative branches failed to define adequacy “with specific-
ity . . . before the end of fiscal year 2007,”49 the majority indicated that “we 
will then be required to take further action to enforce the mandates of Part 
II, Article 83 of the New Hampshire Constitution.”50  These remedies in-
cluded the remedies suggested by Justices Duggan and Galway in their 
separate opinions and “appointing a special master to aid in the determina-
tion of the definition of a constitutionally adequate education.”51  Justice 
  
accountability,’ and that these four mandates comprise the state’s duty to provide an adequate educa-
tion.”  Londonderry I, 907 A.2d at 990.  The State, however, clearly was not making such an “asser-
tion” as House Bill 616 neither defined an adequate education, see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-E:2, 
nor calculated its cost.  See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 198:40-a, 198:40-b, 198:40-c.  Thus, the court 
eschewed the fundamental question presented by House Bill 616: does Part II, Article 83 actually 
impose such mandates on the representative branches? 
 46. Londonderry I, 907 A.2d at 995. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 994.  In 1998, the legislature, in RSA 193-E:2, codified the “general, aspirational” guide-
lines announced in Claremont II.  1998 N.H. Laws 548 (Chapter 389:1).  In Opinion of the Justices 
(Reformed Public School Financing System), 765 A.2d 673 (N.H. 2000), the court adumbrated Lon-
donderry I as it indicated that RSA 193-E:2 was not the sort of definition it expected because it did not 
believe that RSA 193-E:2 could be used to calculate the cost of an adequate education.  Id. at 677. 
 49. Londonderry I, 907 A.2d at 995. 
 50. Id.  Note that the Claremont II mandates, which were grounded only on the court’s “acknowl-
edgment” of the Attorney General’s “assertion” that Claremont II imposed these mandates, see supra 
note 46, infra note 55, are here given constitutional pedigree as they are referred to as the “Part II, 
Article 83 mandates.” 
 51. Londonderry I, 907 A.2d at 995.  The majority agreed with Justice Galway’s concern 
that this court or any court not take over the legislature’s role in shaping educational and 
fiscal policy. . . . However, the judiciary has a responsibility to ensure that constitutional 
rights not be hollowed out and, in the absence of action by other branches, a judicial remedy 
is not only appropriate but essential. 
Id. at 996.  The only authority provided by the majority for this power was a case decided in 2004, In re 
Below, 855 A.2d 459 (N.H. 2004), which involved redistricting.  However, there is nothing in Below 
that suggests that the power of the judiciary to redistrict was derived from some general power to 
impose judicial remedies whenever the court believes that constitutional rights are being hollowed out.  
Id. at 473.  The majority’s view of the court’s remedial powers turns the framer’s understanding of the 
judiciary’s powers on its head.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Whoever atten-
tively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they 
are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least 
dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or 
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Duggan’s remedy was to “remand this case to the trial court for further 
factual development regarding whether the funding provided in House Bill 
616 is sufficient to fund a constitutionally adequate education,”52 while 
Justice Galway would have “declare[d] House Bill 616 unconstitutional on 
its face”53 because “by remanding to the superior court, or by appointing a 
special master, we risk usurping the legislature’s prerogative to set educa-
tional and fiscal policy.”54 
To recap the gloss that the supreme court has placed on Part II, Article 
83: Article 83 mandates that the representative branches define an adequate 
education in a manner that gives “specific substantive content” to Clare-
mont II’s aspirational guidelines,55 that is “sufficiently clear to permit 
common understanding and allow for an objective determination of 
costs,”56 and that incorporates standards of accountability to enable judicial 
oversight.57  Additionally, Article 83 mandates comparable per pupil 
spending58 and that the entire cost of an adequate education be funded with 
state taxes.59  Finally, Article 83 empowers the court to effectuate these 
  
injure them.  The [e]xecutive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community.  
The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of 
every citizen are to be regulated.  The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword 
or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active 
resolution whatever.  It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and 
must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”). 
 52. Londonderry I, 907 A.2d at 998.  Duggan appeared ready to discard the “mandate” to define an 
adequate education: “Indeed, in my view, a legislative determination of the cost of a constitutionally 
adequate education using an acceptable method for determining that cost could also satisfy the need to 
define a constitutionally adequate education.”  Id. at 1001.  These so-called “acceptable methods,” 
however, are completely arbitrary.  See Mosca, supra note 3, at 428. 
 53. Londonderry I, 907 A.2d at 1002.  While Galway thought the court should “stay this ruling until 
the end of fiscal year 2007 so that school districts will receive the state funding they anticipated,” id., 
should the representative branches fail to define an adequate education in the interim, his remedy 
would result in public schools receiving no funding.  Thus, it suffers from the same illogic as the ap-
proach attributed to an American officer during the Vietnam War by reporter Peter Arnett: “It became 
necessary to destroy the village to save it.” 
 54. Id.  Galway argued that the court’s role should end “[o]nce the legislature provides the children 
of this [s]tate with what it determines to be a constitutionally adequate education.”  Id.  To do other-
wise, would be to “sit in continuous judgment over educational policy decisions” and “the legislature’s 
fiscal policy.”  Id.  Here, Justice Galway is quoting from the dissent in the accountability decision, 
Claremont III, which was written jointly by Justices Nadeau (who in the interim retired and was re-
placed by Galway) and Justice Dalianis.  Justice Dalianis’ position is curious as a judicially written 
definition of an adequate education and/or determination of the cost of an adequate education, which 
she endorsed in Londonderry I, and seems to be a far more egregious trespass on legislative powers 
than the “standards of accountability” which she rejected in Claremont III. 
 55. Londonderry I, 907 A.2d at 990. 
 56. Id. at 995. 
 57. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont III), 794 A.2d 744, 751 (N.H. 2002). 
 58. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1360 (N.H. 1997). 
 59. Londonderry I, 907 A.2d at 995. 
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mandates itself, in the absence of what it deems satisfactory action by the 
representative branches.60 
III.  THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF PART II, ARTICLE 83  
“An obvious starting point in interpreting part II, article 83 is to deter-
mine what the particular words used meant in 1784.”61  So let us begin 
with the text of Article 83. 
A. Text 
Part II, Article 83, which was adopted as part of the 1784 New Hamp-
shire Constitution,62 originally provided: 
ENCOURAGEMENT of LITERATURE, etc. 
Knowledge, and Learning, generally diffused through a commu-
nity, being essential to the preservation of a free government, and 
spreading the opportunities and advantages of education through 
the various parts of the country, being highly conducive to pro-
mote this end; it shall be the duty of the Legislators and magis-
trates, in all future periods of this government, to cherish the inter-
est of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and public 
schools, to encourage private and public institutions, rewards and 
immunities for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, com-
merce, trades, manufacturers, and natural history of the country; to 
countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and general 
benevolence, public and private charity, industry and economy, 
honesty and punctuality, sincerity, sobriety, and all social affec-
tions, and generous sentiments, among the people.63 
1. The Absence of Standards. 
The manifest textual problem with construing Article 83 to impose “a 
duty on the State to provide a constitutionally adequate education to every 
  
 60. Id. at 996. 
 61. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 635 A.2d 1375, 1378 (N.H. 1993). 
 62. “New Hampshire has had two constitutions.  The first was the temporary constitution of 1776, 
the first written constitution adopted in the original colonies, which predated the United States Declara-
tion of Independence by six months.  The second was the permanent constitution, which went into 
effect in 1784.”  SUSAN E. MARSHALL, THE NEW HAMPSHIRE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 1 
(2004). 
 63. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83, reprinted in MARSHALL, supra note 62, at 243. 
File: Mosca - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 2 Created on: 12/6/2007 4:35:00 PM Last Printed: 12/7/2007 9:26:00 AM 
2007 NEW HAMPSHIRE CONSTITUTION'S EDUCATION CLAUSE 221 
 
educable child in the public schools in New Hampshire and to guarantee 
adequate funding,” 64 as the court did in Claremont I, is that Article 83 says 
nothing at all about “adequacy.”  It simply says that “it shall be the duty of 
the Legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of this government, to 
cherish the interest of . . . public schools.”65  Indeed, this was the very rea-
son that the trial court had dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.  “New Hamp-
shire’s Encouragement of Literature Clause contains no language regarding 
equity, uniformity, or even adequacy of education.  Thus, the New Hamp-
shire Constitution imposes no qualitative standard of education, which 
must be met.  Likewise, the New Hampshire Constitution imposes no 
quantifiable financial duty regarding education.”66 
The court’s textual analysis simply eschews discussion of the absence of 
any standards in Article 83.  Instead, the court framed the relevant question 
as whether “the duty . . . to cherish the interest of . . . public schools”67 was 
mandatory, or a statement of aspiration.  “To suggest that the language of 
Article 83 is not mandatory because other states’ constitutions, many 
drafted over 100 years after ours, contain more concrete, tangible standards 
of quality of education and quantity of support is an analysis we cannot 
endorse.”68   
However, even if Article 83 is mandatory, that still leaves the question: 
what does Article 83 mandate?  To construe the meager language “cherish 
the interest of . . . public schools”69 to mandate a public education system 
based upon the multifarious guidelines enumerated in Claremont II70 is, as 
one judge has colorfully put it, “a display of stunning judicial imagina-
tion.”71  Stated differently, the interpretive problem is not that Article 83 
  
 64. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1376. 
   65. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83. 
 66. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1377. 
 67. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83. 
 68. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1378.  To the contrary,  
the mere fact that a state constitution has an education clause does not mean that a particular 
standard of quality is necessarily mandated.  After all, forty-nine states have education 
clauses of some form.  Yet, the clauses have a variety of different wordings.  Given the dif-
ferences in wording, courts should not assume that all of them mandate the same or nearly 
the same quality standard.  Instead, the court should focus on the actual language of the 
education clause and the way it compares to the educational provisions of other states.   
William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massa-
chusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 605 (1994).  In Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor 
(Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997), the court compounded this error by adopting the 
“seven criteria articulated by the Supreme Court of Kentucky as establishing general, aspirational 
guidelines for defining educational adequacy,” although the Kentucky education clause describes the 
duty as to “provide for an efficient system of public schools throughout the state.”  Id. at 1362 (Horton, 
J., dissenting) (quoting the Kentucky Constitution).   
 69. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83. 
 70. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359–60. 
 71. Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1160 (Mass. 2005) (Cowin, J., concurring). 
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contains standards that are less “concrete”72 and “tangible” 73 than the stan-
dards in education clauses of other state constitutions.  It is that it contains 
no standards at all. 
It is unclear what point the court was trying to make when it observed 
that many of the state constitutions containing concrete, tangible standards 
in their education clauses were drafted more than 100 years after Article 
83.74  It is clear, however, one does not need to look 100 years down the 
road, as the court seemed to imply, in order to find state constitutions “con-
tain[ing] more concrete, tangible standards” regarding public education.75  
Various extant state constitutions contained such standards.   
For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 provided that: 
A school or schools shall be established in each county by the leg-
islature, for the convenient instruction of youth, with such salaries 
to the masters paid by the public, as may enable them to instruct 
youth at low prices: And all useful learning shall be duly encour-
aged and promoted In one or more universities.76 
The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 also provided:  
That a school or schools shall be established by the Legislature, for 
the convenient instruction of youth, with such salaries to the mas-
ters, paid by the public, as may enable them to instruct at low 
prices; and all useful learning shall be duly encouraged, and pro-
moted, in one or more universities.77 
The Georgia Constitution of 1777 provided that “[s]chools shall be erected 
in each county and supported at the general expense of the State, as the 
legislature shall hereafter point out.”78 
Additional evidence of contemporaneous “concrete, tangible stan-
dards”79 can be found in neighboring Vermont’s constitution.  The Ver-
mont Constitution of 1777 provided that: 
  
 72. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1378. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 44, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa08.htm.  
The 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution was in effect until 1790. 
 77. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XLI, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ 
nc07.htm.  The 1776 North Carolina Constitution was in effect until 1868.  See John V. Oarth, Sympo-
sium: “The Law of The Land”: The North Carolina Constitution and State Constitutional Law: North 
Carolina Constitutional History, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1759 (1992).  
 78. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LIV, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ga02.htm.  
The 1777 Georgia Constitution was in effect until 1789.   
 79. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1378. 
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A school or schools shall be established in each town, by the legis-
lature, for the convenient instruction of youth, with such salaries to 
the masters, paid by each town; making proper use of school lands 
in each town, thereby to enable them to instruct youth at low 
prices.  One grammar school in each county, and one university in 
this State, ought to be established by direction of the General As-
sembly.80   
If the purpose of Article 83 was to impose “a duty on the State to pro-
vide a constitutionally adequate education to every educable child in the 
public schools in New Hampshire and to guarantee adequate funding,”81 
the framers presumably would have used language at least as particular as 
that used in the extant constitutions of Pennsylvania, North Carolina, 
Georgia, and Vermont.82  The lack of such language suggests that the vot-
ers who adopted Article 83 would not have understood Article 83 to re-
quire even universal public education, never mind the “adequate educa-
tion” fashioned in the Claremont decisions.83 
2. Putting the Duty to Cherish Public Schools in Context 
The court also looked to the purpose of Article 83 to determine the 
meaning of its “duty . . . to cherish the interest of . . . public schools.”84  
The court described the purpose as “spreading the opportunities and advan-
tages of education through the various parts of the country” in order to 
“preserv[e] a free democratic state.”85  Based on this purpose, the court 
  
 80. VT. CONST. of 1777, § XL, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/vt01.htm.  
The 1777 Vermont Constitution was in effect until 1786.  Vermont became the fourteenth state in 1791 
and, in 1793, adopted a new constitution. 
 81. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1376. 
 82. The Pennsylvania Constitution “became a model for numerous other state constitutions which 
followed suit.”  Ken Gormley, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, 1990 Forward: A New Constitu-
tional Vigor for the Nation’s Oldest Court, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 215, 216 (1991).  
 83. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 also indicates that the contemporaneous understanding of 
language such as Article 83’s “cherish the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and 
public schools” was that it was exhortatory.  The Northwest Ordinance used language similar to Article 
83’s as it declared that “[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and 
the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”  32 JOUR-
NALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 340 (July 13, 1787) [hereinafter JOURNALS], 
available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc032121)).  
However, that language would have been viewed as exhortatory since the Land Ordinance of 1785, 
which also applied to the Northwest Territory, already specifically provided that each township would 
have its own public school: “There shall be reserved the lot N 16 of every township, for the mainte-
nance of public schools, within the said township.”  28 JOURNALS, supra, at 378 (May 20, 1785), 
available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=lljc&fileName=028/lljc028.db&recNum= 
389&itemLink=r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc028100))%230280390&linkText=1. 
 84. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83. 
 85. Claremont I, 625 A.2d at 1377–78. 
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concluded that the language “‘shall be the duty to cherish’ . . . commands, 
in no uncertain terms, that the State provide an education to all its citizens 
and that it support all public schools.”86  However, the court never ex-
plained how this conclusion—that Article 83 requires universal public 
education—leads to Claremont I’s holding that Article 83 imposes a duty 
to “provide a constitutionally adequate education . . . and to guarantee ade-
quate funding.”87 
It is, to say the least, quite a leap of logic to go from “provide an edu-
cation to all its citizens,” to “provide a constitutionally adequate education 
to all its citizens.”88  Indeed, it is also a leap of logic to go from “spreading 
the opportunities and advantages of education through the various parts of 
the country” in order to “preserv[e] a free democratic state” to “provide an 
education to all its citizens.”89  The bigger problem with the court’s textual 
analysis, however, is that it is much too truncated. 
While one would never know it from reading the Claremont cases, the 
duty to cherish public schools is just one of many duties established by 
Article 83, which in turn is just part of a larger constitution.  When the 
duty “to cherish the interest of . . . public schools”90 is viewed in these con-
texts, it bears no resemblance to the duty to provide and fund an adequate 
education described in the Claremont cases. 
The duty to cherish the interest of public schools is just one of many 
duties enumerated in Article 83.  There are also duties to “encourage pri-
vate and public institutions, rewards and immunities for the promotion of 
agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufacturers, and natural 
history of the country,” and “to countenance and inculcate the principles of 
humanity and general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and 
economy, honesty and punctuality, sincerity, sobriety, and all social affec-
tions, and generous sentiments, among the people.”91  Yet none of these 
has ever been deemed a command.  It would be quite peculiar to include a 
single mandatory duty in a lengthy enumeration of exhortations.  It is more 
reasonable, therefore, to read the duty to cherish public schools as the same 
sort as the other Article 83 duties. 
Even if the duty “to cherish” could be distinguished from the duties to 
“encourage,” and “countenance and inculcate,”92 public schools are just 
one of several objects whose “interest” Article 83 says “the Legislators and 
  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1376. 
 88. Id. at 1376–77. 
 89. Id. at 1377. 
 90. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83. 
 91. Id. 
 92. But see Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1378 (providing similar contemporary definitions of “encour-
age” and “cherish”). 
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magistrates” have a duty to “cherish.”  More specifically, Article 83 says 
that “it shall be the duty of the Legislators and magistrates, in all future 
periods of this government, to cherish the interest of literature and the sci-
ences, and all seminaries and public schools.”93  There is nothing in this 
language that suggests that public schools should take priority over the 
other objects of the duty to cherish.  If anything, its position as last in the 
enumeration suggests that it may have been considered the least important 
means of “spreading the opportunities and advantages of education.”94  In 
sum, the context indicates that the duty to cherish the interest of literature, 
the sciences, and all seminaries is at least coextensive with the duty to 
cherish the interest of all public schools.95  It follows then that if the duties 
to cherish the interest of literature, the sciences, and all seminaries are ex-
hortatory, so too is the duty to cherish the interest of the public schools. 
There is an even bigger flaw in the court’s textual analysis than its se-
lective parsing of the language of Article 83.  Even if the duty to cherish 
the interest of the public schools could be distinguished from all of the 
other duties enumerated in Article 83, Claremont’s conceptualization of 
this duty is irreconcilable with the structural nature of the constitution. 
Since the adoption of the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, the 
principle of separation of powers between the three branches of govern-
ment has been expressed in Part I, Article 37, which reads as follows: 
In the government of this state, the three essential powers thereof, 
to wit, the Legislative, Executive and Judicial, ought to be kept as 
separate from and independent of each other, as the nature of a free 
government will admit, or as is consistent with that chain of con-
nection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indis-
soluble bond of union and amity.96 
  
 93. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83. 
 94. Id. 
 95. The historical evidence also indicates that no special emphasis was placed on the duty to cherish 
the public schools.  On “7th Nov. 1783, the General Court passed an act for the encouragement of 
literature and genius, and for securing to author the exclusive right and benefit of publishing their 
literary productions for twenty year,” but did not turn to the public schools until 1789.  NATHANIEL 
BOUTON, THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN NEW HAMPSHIRE: A DISCOURSE DELIVERED BEFORE THE 
NEW HAMPSHIRE HISTORICAL SOCIETY, reprinted in 4 COLLECTIONS OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY 20 (Concord, N.H., Marsh, Capen and Lyon 1834).  “As a further evidence of the 
new impulse given to education, social libraries were established in several towns of the State, and a 
medical society was incorporated (1791) by an act of assembly.”  GEORGE BUSH, HISTORY OF 
EDUCATION IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 13 (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office 1898). 
 96. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 37.  See MARSHALL, supra note 62, at 232–33.  
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Echoing James Madison’s words in The Federalist No. 47,97 the court has 
described this separation of powers as “essential to protect against a sei-
zure of control by one branch that would threaten the ability of our citizens 
to remain a free and sovereign people.”98  The second part of the constitu-
tion, which is titled the Form of Government, effectuates the separation of 
powers by distributing governmental powers between the three branches.  
However, the Claremont decisions simply ignore the structural nature of 
the constitution. 
The constitution of 1784 conferred the powers to make laws, raise 
taxes, and spend money on the representative branches.99  The lawmaking 
power was conferred without any requirements as to how it was to be exer-
cised.  Rather, the legislature was conferred the “full power and authority” 
to make “all manner of wholesome and reasonable” laws “as they may 
judge for the benefit and welfare of this state.”100  Similarly, the taxing and 
spending powers authorized, but did not require, any particular taxes or 
expenditures.101  Reading Article 83 to require the representative branches 
to provide a particular standard of education or a particular quantum of 
funding to the public schools, as the court did in Claremont I,102 is irrecon-
cilable with this general grant to the representative branches of the law-
making, spending, and taxing powers. 
  
 97. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).  James Madison explained that the separation of 
powers principle was needed to prevent tyrannical government.  “The accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether 
hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”  Id. 
 98. In re Governor & Executive Council, 846 A.2d 1148, 1154 (N.H. 2004) (quoting In re Mone, 71 
A.2d 626, 631 (N.H. 1998)).  The court has utilized the “political question” doctrine developed by the 
federal courts to prevent judicial violation of the separation of powers.  Baines v. N.H. Senate Presi-
dent, 876 A.2d 768, 774–75 (N.H. 2005) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).  Among 
other circumstances, a case involves a nonjusticiable political question “where there is a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”  Hughes v. Speaker of N.H. House 
of Representatives, 876 A.2d 736, 743 (N.H. 2005) (quoting In re Judicial Conduct Comm., 751 A.2d 
514, 516 (N.H. 2000)).  By each measure, what level of education is adequate and how much funding is 
necessary to reach that level are quintessentially political questions.  See Mosca, supra note 3. 
 99. See MARSHALL, supra note 62, at 233–34, 240.  Under the current version of the New Hamp-
shire Constitution, the power to make laws is found in part II, articles 2 & 5, the power to raise taxes in 
part I, article 28 and part II, article 5, and the spending power in part II, article 56. 
 100. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 5; MARSHALL, supra note 62, at 233–34.  The electorate was particularly 
solicitous about protecting legislative power.  Prior versions of the Constitution of 1784 proposed a 
governor possessing the power to veto legislation.  9 NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE PAPERS 859, 883 (Na-
thanial Bouton ed., Concord, N.H., Pearson 1875), available at http://www.sos.nh.gov/archives/PDF/ 
NHSP-V09.pdf.  These were rejected in 1781 and 1782 in large measure due to “disapproval of the 
strong governor concept.”  MARSHALL, supra note 62, at 12.  The Constitution of 1784 contained no 
executive veto and even changed the title of the governor to president.  9 NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE 
PAPERS, supra, at 903, 909.  It was not until 1792 that amendments established the office of governor, 
see N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 41, and the veto power, see N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 44. 
 101. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 28, pt. II, arts. 5, 56; MARSHALL, supra note 62, at 234, 240.  
 102. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 635 A.2d 1375, 1376 (N.H. 1993). 
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The gloss placed on the Claremont I holdings by subsequent Clare-
mont decisions runs roughshod over the principle of separation of powers.  
Interpreting the constitution to require that the legislature define an ade-
quate education in a manner that gives “specific substantive content” to 
Claremont II’s aspirational guidelines,103 that is “sufficiently clear to per-
mit a common understanding and allow for an objective determination of 
costs,”104 and that incorporates standards of accountability to enable judi-
cial oversight,105 makes a mockery of the constitution’s grant to the legisla-
ture of the “supreme legislative power” and the “full power and authority” 
to make laws.106  The court’s assertion in Londonderry I that, in the ab-
sence of what it deems satisfactory action by the representative branches, it 
is constitutionally empowered to “take further action to enforce the man-
dates of Part II, Article 83 of the New Hampshire Constitution”107 repre-
sents the very government of men and not of laws that the founding gen-
eration abhorred.108 
The language of Article 83 is consistent with the separation of powers.  
Although the court described Article 83 as imposing a duty on “the 
State,”109 which implies that the duty applies to state government as a 
whole, the language of the article explicitly provides that the duties it enu-
merates are duties only “of the Legislators and magistrates.”110  The term 
“magistrate” refers to the executive branch.111  Thus, the language of Arti-
cle 83 indicates that the legislative and executive branches are responsible 
for determining and effectuating the form and scope of its various duties.112   
  
 103. Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU # 12 v. State (Londonderry I), 907 A.2d 988, 990 (N.H. 2006). 
 104. Id. at 995. 
 105. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont III), 794 A.2d 744, 751 (N.H. 2002).  
 106. N.H. CONST. pt. II, arts. 2, 5. 
 107. Londonderry I, 907 A.2d at 995. 
 108. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 30.  This famous phrase was coined by John Adams, the father of the 
Massachusetts Constitution, upon which New Hampshire “modeled much of [its] constitution,” and 
which “contains a nearly identical provision regarding education.”  Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor 
(Claremont I), 625 A.2d 1375, 1378 (N.H. 1993).  It meant a government based on the separation of 
powers, which it describes as follows: 
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the 
executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legis-
lative and judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial shall never exercise the legislative 
and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not 
of men.  
MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 30. 
 109. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1376.   
 110. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83.   
 111. See id. art. 41 (referring to Governor as a supreme executive magistrate).  Under the Constitu-
tion of 1784, there was a president rather than a governor, but the president was also the “supreme 
executive magistrate.”  See MARSHALL, supra note 62, at 238. 
 112. Hancock v, Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1160 (Mass. 2005) (Cowin, J., concurring) 
(“Where the drafters explicitly conferred authority on only two of the branches of government, [the 
Supreme Court] cannot ordain the third branch ‘overseer.’”).  See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112–13 
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In sum, the holdings of the Claremont cases are irreconcilable with the 
text of the constitution.  Assuming for the sake of argument that Article 83 
should be read to require public schools, its language cannot be read to 
prescribe any qualitative standards or any quantifiable level of financial 
support for these public schools.  Nor can Article 83 be read to provide for 
any judicial oversight of the representative branches’ superintendence of 
the public schools.  Thus, Claremont’s “standards of accountability,”113 its 
“general aspirational guidelines for defining educational adequacy,”114 and 
even its, by comparison relatively mild, admonition in Claremont I that the 
representative branches define an adequate education,115 represent a sweep-
ing judicial redrafting of Article 83. 
B. History 
Contemporaneous constructions of constitutional provisions carry 
great weight.116  Accordingly, let us turn to the law of 1789. 
1. The Law of 1789 
Five years after Article 83 was adopted as part of the constitution of 
1784, a law was passed under which “all the laws of this State respecting 
Schools be, and they hereby are, repealed” because “the Laws respecting 
Schools have been found not to answer the important end for which they 
were made.”117  In place of these repealed laws, the law of 1789, which 
remained in effect until 1919,118 required all towns to provide public 
schools and established a system for funding these schools.119  However, 
the law of 1789 neither required that all towns provide the same minimum 
curriculum, nor did it provide comparable state funding for public schools.  
To the extent, then, that the law of 1789 reflects the original understanding 
of Article 83, it belies the notion that Article 83 was understood to require 
the system of public schooling described by the Claremont decisions. 
In relevant part, the text of the law of 1789 is set forth below: 
  
(2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892)HERE? 
(providing that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, elec-
tors for President and Vice President” and “leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the method 
of appointment.”)HERE?. MISSING END PARENTHESIS 
 113. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont III), 794 A.2d 744, 752 (N.H. 2002). 
 114. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997). 
 115. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993). 
 116. Wheeler ex rel. Boulanger v. Morin, 35 A.2d 513, 517 (N.H. 1943). 
 117. 5 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE: FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD 449 (Henry Harrison Metcalf ed., 
1916). 
 118. 1919 N.H. Laws 155 (Chapter 106); see HALL, supra note 4.  
 119. See 5 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 117. 
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[T]he Select men of the Several towns & Parishes within this State 
be, and they hereby are, impowered and required to assess annu-
ally the Inhabitants of their respective towns, according to their 
polls and ratable estates, in a sum to be computed at the rate of five 
pounds for every twenty shillings of their proportion for public 
taxes for the time being and so for a greater or lesser sum.  Which 
sums, when collected, shall be applyed to the sole purpose of keep-
ing an English Grammar School or Schools for teaching reading, 
writing and arithmetic, within the towns and parishes for which the 
same shall be assessed; except said town be a Shire or half shire 
town: in which case, the School by them kept shall be a grammer 
School for the purpose of teaching the latin and greek languages, 
as well as reading, writing and arithmetic as aforesaid.120  
Thus, while all towns were required to provide a school “for teaching read-
ing, writing and arithmetic,” shire towns and half shire towns, which were 
the county seats, were also required to teach “the latin and greek lan-
guages.”  This disparate treatment suggests that Article 83 was not under-
stood to require that “every educable child in the public schools”121 receive 
the same minimum qualitative standard of education. 
Turning next to the funding system established by the law of 1789, a 
town was required to collect taxes based on its “proportion for public tax-
es,” and the entire amount of taxes collected in each town was required to 
be spent on public schools within that town.  A town’s “proportion” was 
determined in the following manner. 
The legislature set the total amount of spending for the year.122  In 
1790, it set the amount at approximately the pound equivalent of $16,500, 
which was periodically increased over intervals ranging from one to 
twenty-two years until it reached $750,000 in 1905.123  Each town was 
required to collect from its taxpayers a percentage of the total spending 
amount that was equivalent to the town’s percentage of the state’s tax 
base.124  For example, if a town’s taxable wealth comprised two percent of 
  
 120. Id.   
 121. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1376. 
 122. Walter A. Backofen, Claremont’s Achilles Heel: The Unrecognized Mandatory School-Tax Law 
of 1789, 43 N.H.B.J. 26, 27 (2002).  See also N.H. CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY STUDIES, BUDGET HISTORY 
AND DRIVERS: BUDGET OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 59 (2003) [hereinafter BUDGET HISTORY], 
available at http://www.nhpolicy.org/jan142003.pdf (“In the new law the legislature set the specific 
amount to be raised for schools in each town and established personal fines for selectmen who did not 
do so.”). 
 123. Backofen, supra note 122, at 27.  See also BUDGET HISTORY, supra note 122, at 60 (summary of 
the amounts that various towns were required to raise under the law of 1789 in selected years). 
 124. BACKOFEN, supra note 4, at 10–11. 
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the taxable wealth in the state in 1790, the law required that town to collect 
from its taxpayers an amount equivalent to two percent of $16,500. 
In other words, the law of 1789 did not provide funding based upon a 
set amount per student or even a set amount per town; instead, it provided 
funding based upon the towns’ respective tax bases.  As a result, the law of 
1789 would have produced the “comparable funding” that the court in 
Claremont II described as “basic” to the concept of adequacy125 only if 
students and taxable wealth were similarly distributed from town to town.  
As one would imagine, there was not a similar distribution.126 
For example, although the amount of total spending set by the legisla-
ture in 1830 was approximately one dollar per pupil, spending varied be-
tween municipalities from approximately twenty-five cents per child to 
eight dollars per child.127  While Enfield and Eaton reported about the same 
number of school-age children in their 1830 census returns, Eaton had only 
about one-half of Enfield’s tax base.128  As a result, per pupil state funding 
in Eaton would have been approximately only one-half of that in Enfield. 
The disparities between towns increased over time.  The Journal of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1850 reported that:  
Twenty towns out of the 230 in the State raised last year one third 
part of all the money required by law for the support of common 
schools.  The number of scholars in these towns is a fraction more 
than one fifth of the whole number in the State.129  
As a result, the towns were not “enjoy[ing] as nearly as may be practicable, 
equal advantages of education.”130  By 1900, less than five percent of 
towns contained fifty percent of the state’s tax base.131 
The law of 1789 also cannot be seen as providing a base amount of 
adequate funding to all towns, notwithstanding the funding disparities be-
tween towns.  The Journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1850 noted 
that, “[t]he legislators of New Hampshire have not been unobservant of 
that excellent article in our constitution, which enjoined upon them, ‘the 
encouragement of literature and the sciences, and the cherishing of all se-
  
 125. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1357, 1360 (N.H. 1997).   
 126. See WALTER A. BACKOFEN, NEW HAMPSHIRE’S PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM: 1789–1918, at 1 
(2002) (“Funding inequities among schoolchildren were guaranteed from the beginning, compounded 
by an increasing stratification of the state’s wealth, and made still worse by a statewide fragmentation 
into school districts that lasted from 1805 to 1885.”). 
 127. WALTER A. BACKOFEN, ON THE PERVERSION OF NEW HAMPSHIRE HISTORY 8 (2006).   
 128. BACKOFEN, supra note 126, at 17. 
 129. STATE OF N.H., JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 53 (1850), available at http://www.sos.nh.gov/archives/PDF/ConConvText.pdf 
[hereinafter JOURNAL]. 
 130. Id. 
 131. BACKOFEN, supra note 126, at 17.   
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minaries and public schools.’”132  Nevertheless, “our common schools are 
still far from being what they should be and might be.”133  The culprit was 
the law of 1789. 
If a town’s tax base did not increase as fast as the state’s tax base during 
the intervals between adjustments of the overall spending amount, the 
town’s proportionate share of overall spending decreased.  Since a town’s 
“proportion” determined the amount of school taxes it would collect, this 
meant that in the towns becoming poorer in relative terms, tax revenue 
collected under the law of 1789 decreased even if the number of pupils 
stayed the same or increased.134  For example, the Journal of the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1850 noted that a “material” increase in the amount of 
overall spending was “needed at this time, especially by the small towns, 
and those of middling population; for while these remain nearly stationary, 
others increase in both respects.  The proportional valuation of the farming 
towns, heretofore, becomes less, even while they do not diminish in num-
bers or amount of property.”135  As a result, many of the relatively poorer 
towns imposed additional taxes in order to fund schools at a higher level 
than provided under the law of 1789.136  In a town that did not, the educa-
tion budget could be “reduced to the point of devastation for its 
schools.”137 
In sum, the law of 1789 is the antithesis of what one would expect if 
the original understanding of Article 83 was that it imposed the type of 
duty to provide and fund an adequate education fashioned in the Claremont 
decisions. 
2. The Court’s Examination of History 
Incredibly, the Claremont I decision never mentions the law of 1789.  
Instead, the court’s examination of the “surrounding circumstances” at the 
time the constitution of 1784 was adopted138 was a survey of prior educa-
  
 132. JOURNAL, supra note 129, at 52. 
 133. Id. at 53. 
 134. BACKOFEN, supra note 127, at 8–9. 
 135. See JOURNAL, supra note 129, at 53. 
 136. BACKOFEN, supra note 127, at 15.  The JOURNAL, supra note 129, at 53, noted that, “unless by 
special vote they add to the sums required to be raised by law their means of education are unduly 
abridged.”  Cf. Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N.H. 113, 128 (N.H 1834) (“The selectmen are bound to make this 
assessment if a town should not vote to raise any money for the support of schools; but towns may, if 
they think proper, vote to raise a larger sum than the selectmen are thus bound to assess; and with a 
commendable zeal in the cause of education this is often done.”). 
 137. BACKOFEN, supra note 4, at 12. 
 138. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 635 A.2d 1375, 1379 (N.H. 1993). 
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tion laws dating back to 1642.139  Laws passed over a hundred years prior 
to passage of Article 83 have dubious relevance to the original understand-
ing of Article 83, while the more recent laws also have dubious relevance 
because the law of 1789 repealed all existing education laws for the reason 
that “the Laws respecting Schools have been found not to answer the im-
portant end for which they were made.”140  However, to the extent that 
these pre-1784 laws reflect what the voters who adopted the constitution 
understood Article 83’s “duty . . . to cherish the interest of . . . public 
schools” to mean, they certainly did not understand it to require the sort of 
“adequate education” fashioned by Claremont.141 
The court’s review began with education laws passed in 1642 and 
1647, which was a time when “New Hampshire and Massachusetts were 
united as a single province.”142  The law of 1642, however, had nothing to 
do with public education.  Rather, it was a mandatory home schooling law, 
which had the express purpose of inculcating religion.143  Parents and mas-
ters to whom children had been apprenticed were responsible for providing 
“so much learning as may inable them perfectly to read the [E]nglish 
tongue, & knowledge of the Capital Lawes,” and “once a week (at the 
  
 139. Id. at 1379–80.  Because there was “an extensive history of public education in this State,” 
which comprised part of the “background” to the constitutional convention, the court found “uncon-
vincing” the contention that “the framers and the general populace did not understand the language 
contained in part II, article 83 to impose a duty on the State to support the public schools and ensure an 
educated citizenry.”  Id. at 1380.  To the contrary, “the contemporary understanding was that part II, 
article 83 imposed a duty on the State to provide universal public education and to support the 
schools.”  Id. at 1380–81.  As noted previously, it requires a leap of logic to go from “provide universal 
public education” to an adequate education.  It also requires an antecedent leap of logic to go from “an 
extensive history of public education” to “universal public education.”  Thus, the court’s use of history, 
like its textual analysis, is unpersuasive. 
 140. 5 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 117, at 449. 
 141. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1380–81.  The court also offered exchanges between Governor Wen-
tworth and the province’s General Assembly in 1771 and Governor Gilman and the legislature in 1795 
as evidence of the “surrounding circumstances,” claiming in particular that the latter “has significant 
probative value as an indication that the contemporary understanding was that part II, article 83 im-
posed a duty on the State to provide universal public education and to support the schools.”  Id.  How-
ever, these exchanges are not weighty evidence of the original understanding.  It is, at best, doubtful 
that the colloquy between Wentworth and the Assembly in 1771 was on the voters’ minds when they 
ratified Article 83 a decade and one-half later, while the 1795 colloquy between Gilman and the legisla-
ture could not have influenced the voters’ understanding of Article 83 a decade earlier.  In any case, 
there is no mention in either of an “adequate education” or even universal public education. 
 142. Id. at 1379.  New Hampshire was part of the Massachusetts Bay Colony from 1641 to 1679, and 
again from 1688 to 1691. 
 143. MASSACHUSETTS BAY SCHOOL LAW (1642), available at http://personal.pitnet.net/primary 
sources/schoollaw1642.html.  The court noted at the outset of its historical review that the Puritans 
“emigrated ‘chiefly to enjoy and propagate their religion.’”  Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1379 (quoting 
BOUTON, supra note 95, at 5).   
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least) catechiz[ing] their children and servants in the grounds & principles 
of Religion.”144 
The law of 1647 was also known as the Old Deluder Satan Act be-
cause, as the preamble indicates, it was intended to counter Lucifer’s 
yearning to keep men illiterate to prevent them from reading scripture: 
It being one chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men 
from the knowledge of the Scriptures, as in former times by keep-
ing them in an unknown tongue, so in these latter times by per-
suading from the use of tongues, that so that at least the true sense 
and meaning of the original might be clouded and corrupted with 
false glosses of saint-seeming deceivers; and to the end that learn-
ing may not be buried in the grave of our forefathers, in church and 
commonwealth, the Lord assisting our endeavors . . . .145 
The court’s characterizations of this law as introducing the principles that 
“schooling was to be provided for all children, and that the State would 
control education,”146 were gross overstatements.  It was only when a town 
reached fifty families that it “shall forthwith appoint one within their town 
to teach all such children as shall resort to him to write and read.”147  And 
it was only when any town “increase[d] to the number of one hundred 
families or householders, they shall set up a grammer school . . . to instruct 
youth so far as they shall be fitted for the university.”148  This may have left 
Exeter, one of the four New Hampshire towns under Massachusetts juris-
diction, without a public school.149  The only provincial control was the 
  
 144. See MASSACHUSETTS BAY SCHOOL LAW, supra note 143.  The law further provided that the 
selectmen could assess a “penaltie of twentie shillings for each neglect therin,” and that, if the parents 
or master were found “negligent of their dutie in the particulars aforementioned wherby children and 
servants become rude, stubborn & unruly,” the selectmen could “take such children or apprentices from 
them & place them with some masters for years . . . which will more strictly look unto, and force them 
to submit unto government according to the rules of this order.”  Id. 
 145. The Old Deluder Act (1647), in 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE 
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 203 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White 
1853), available at http://personal.pitnet.net/primarysources/deluder.html. 
 146. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1379. 
 147. The Old Deluder Act, supra note 145.  The cost was to “be paid either by the parents or masters 
of such children, or by the inhabitants in general.”  Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. BOUTON, supra note 95, at 10−11. Bouton stated:  
Let it be borne in mind, that Portsmouth, Dover, Hampton and Exeter, then the only 
towns in New-Hampshire, were under the jurisdiction of Massachusetts.  To these of course 
the above law extended, so far as they had the requisite number of families.  In 1680, the 
number of legal voters in Portsmouth was 71; in Dover, 61; in Hampton, 57; and in Exeter, 
20.  We may therefore, presume that schools were kept in at least three of these towns, dur-
ing this dark period of our history.    
Id.  Exactly how many children would have fallen outside the ambit of the law of 1647 is unknown as 
the earliest census on record with the New Hampshire Secretary of State is from 1732.  New Hamp-
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requirements that the towns hire a teacher and set up a grammar school 
when they reached a certain size.  The towns had the discretion to deter-
mine how much money would be raised to pay the schoolmasters and fund 
the schools.150 
The next law mentioned by the court was a 1693 law, which was de-
scribed as “requiring the towns’ selectmen to raise money by ‘an equal rate 
and assessment’ on the inhabitants for the construction and maintenance of 
schools ‘and allowing a Sallary to a School Master’” and assessing a pen-
alty “for failure to comply with the statute.”151  However, it was repealed in 
1706.152  Although it was largely readopted in 1714, it no longer carried a 
penalty for noncompliance.153   
The court then turned to the law of 1719.154  This law, however, was 
simply an updated version of the 1647 Old Deluder Satan Act as it pro-
vided that  
Every Town within this Province having the number of Fifty 
Householders or upwards, Shall be constantly provided of a 
Schoolmaster to teach Children & youth to read and write. And 
where any Town or Towns have the number of one Hundred Fami-
lies or Husholders [sic], there Shall also be a Grammer School Sett 
up and kept in every Such Town, & Some Discreet person of good 
Conversation well Instructed in the Tongues shall be procured to 
be Master thereof, every Such Schoolmaster to be Suitably En-
couraged and paid by the Inhabitants.155  
  
shire Archives and Records Management, http://www.sos.nh.gov/archives/genealogy.html (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2007).  But see BACKOFEN, supra note 4, at 9.  Backofen stated: 
A town just shy of fifty families was one of no mean size in a society of settlers; while all 
such towns, combined, were still home to about 25% of the children under 16 years of age 
in New Hampshire’s Grafton County as late as the first federal census of 1790. 
Id. 
 150. BUSH, supra note 95, at 11. 
 151. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1379 (quoting BUSH, supra note 95, at 10−11).  The law actually had a 
broader scope as the taxes were “for the building & repayring [sic] of meeting houses, Ministeres 
houses School houses, And allowing a Sallary to School Master in Each Towne within this Province.”  
1 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE: PROVINCE PERIOD 561 (Albert Stillman Batchellor, ed., 1904). 
 152. 1 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 151, at 560. 
 153. 2 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 151, at 144 (1913).  The law stated:  
[I]t is hereby further Enacted & Ordained that the Building and Repairing of Meeting 
Houses, Ministers Houses School Houses and Allowing a Sallary to a School Master of 
each Town within this province, The Select men in their Respective Towns shall raise mony 
by an Equal Rate and Assessment upon the Inhabitants in the Same manner as in this pre-
sent Act directed for the Maintenance of the Minister And Every Town within this province, 
shall from and after the publication hereof; Provide a School Master for the Supply of the 
Town. 
Id. 
 154. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1380. 
 155. LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 153, at 336−37; BUSH, supra note 95, at 11. 
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While, as the court noted, “a penalty was provided for failure to comply 
with the statute,”156 the law also provided for the possibility of exemptions 
to towns “uncapable of Complying wth [sic] this act.”157  In 1721, the re-
quirement that towns with one hundred or more families provide grammar 
schools was extended to parishes within the town.158 
These laws remained the basis of New Hampshire’s system of public 
education until the law of 1789 was passed.159  Thus, neither universal pub-
lic education nor State funding for public education were required by law 
when Article 83 was adopted.  Rather, children in towns of under fifty 
families were not entitled to any public education; children in towns of 
between fifty and one hundred families were entitled only to a schoolmas-
ter to teach reading and writing; and only children living in towns of one 
hundred or more families were entitled to grammar schools.  The towns, 
not the province, were responsible for funding the schoolmasters and 
grammar schools. 
Nor was there any custom or practice of universal public education or 
State support of public schools when Article 83 was adopted.  According 
to New Hampshire historians George Bush and Nathaniel Bouton: “From 
the beginning of the eighteenth century until near its close there was great 
apathy in the matter of maintaining schools, and law respecting education 
being but partially enforced.”160  Since “there were less than fifty families 
in a large portion of the towns and the inhabitants exceedingly scattered, 
schools were greatly neglected.  Many children were taught all that they 
ever knew of reading and writing at home.”161  As the court noted in 
Claremont I, in 1771, Governor Wentworth complained that: “The Insuffi-
ciency of our present Laws for this purpose, must be too evident, seeing 
nine tenths of your Towns are wholly without Schools, or have such va-
grant foreign Masters as are much worse than none: Being for the most 
part unknown in their principles & deplorably illiterate.”162 
In sum, to the extent that New Hampshire’s pre-1784 education laws 
reflect what the voters who adopted the constitution understood Article 
83’s “duty . . . to cherish the interest of . . . public schools”163 to mean, they 
  
 156. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1380. 
 157. LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 153, at 337. 
 158. Id. at 358. 
 159. HALL, supra note 4. 
 160. BUSH, supra note 95, at 12−13. 
 161. BOUTON, supra note 95, at 12−13.  “It must then be recollected, that during the period under 
review, the settlements in New Hampshire were greatly multiplied.  Instead of 4 towns fringing the 
eastern border of the State, about 170 were incorporated, and a sparse population spread over the inte-
rior.”  Id. 
 162. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1380 (citation omitted).  
 163. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83. 
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certainly did not understand it to require the sort of “adequate education” 
fashioned by the Claremont decision.  Indeed, they would not even have 
understood it to require universal public education.   
3. The Constitutional Convention of 1850  
Another historically significant event not mentioned in Claremont I is 
the Constitutional Convention of 1850.  In relevant part, the convention 
recommended that Article 83 be moved to the Bill of Rights section of the 
constitution and that it be replaced in the Form of Government section by 
the following articles: 
89. The Legislature shall make provision for the establishment and 
maintenance of free common schools, at the public expense, and 
for the assessment and collection, annually, in the several towns 
and places in this State, of a sum not less than one hundred and 
twenty-five dollars for every dollar of State taxes, apportioned to 
them respectively, to be applied exclusively to the support of such 
schools.  
90. The supervision of public instruction shall be vested in a State 
Superintendent, and such other officers as the Legislature shall di-
rect. 
91. The State Superintendent shall be chosen, biennially, by the 
qualified electors of the State, in such manner as the Legislature 
shall provide; his powers, duties, and compensation shall be pre-
scribed by law.164 
If Article 83 had been understood to “impose[] a duty on the State to pro-
vide a constitutionally adequate education to every educable child in the 
public schools in New Hampshire and to guarantee adequate funding,”165 it 
would have been pointless to have added proposed Article 89.166  Clearly, 
then, the “very remarkable assembly of the highest learning and ability of 
the state”167 at the convention of 1850 did not read Article 83 in the same 
manner as the Claremont court. 
Proposed Articles 90 and 91 were thought necessary by the Conven-
tion’s “committee on Education” because: 
  
 164. JOURNAL, supra note 129, at 192.  
 165. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1376. 
 166. The same is true for the court’s lesser assertion that Article 83 “commands, in no uncertain 
terms, that the State provide an education to all its citizens and that it support all public schools.”  Id. at 
1378. 
 167. Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 9, 147 (1868). 
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While free schools are admitted by all to be indispensable to our 
security and prosperity as a people, there is not the same unanimity 
of sentiment with reference to the best methods of improving and 
superintending them.  Many men think that the powers already 
conceded to the Legislature by the Constitution are entirely ade-
quate to the wants of the people.  The resolution which the commit-
tee have agreed to offer for the consideration of the Convention 
does not confer new power upon the Legislature, but it proposes to 
make that permanent which is now changeable; to make that im-
perative which is now optional.  It makes it incumbent upon the 
people to elect, from time to time, at least one officer who shall 
devote his time and talents to the great work of popular education. 
. . . Let him devise the best methods of securing good school 
houses, good teachers and good books.  Let him study school ar-
chitecture and bring before the people the most approved modes of 
constructing, warming and ventilating school houses. . . . The 
whole subject of education is open for the investigation of such an 
officer.  He might hold correspondence with ministers of instruc-
tion in foreign kingdoms, and with learned societies in our own 
and foreign lands.  It would be his duty, as well as privilege, to be-
come familiar with text books and apparatus, and be able to rec-
ommend suitable books and furniture for each district that might 
consult him.168 
Thus, this “very remarkable assembly” believed that the sort of State con-
trol of public education that the Claremont decisions assert Article 83 
made mandatory169 was merely “optional.” 
4. Precedent 
The court, up until Claremont, treated Article 83’s duty to cherish the 
interest of the public schools as a political, not a legal, matter.  For exam-
  
 168. JOURNAL, supra note 129, at 54−56 (emphasis added). 
 169. Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU # 12 v. State (Londonderry I), 907 A.2d 988, 990 (N.H. 2006).  
The court stated:  
In Claremont School District v. Governor (Accountability), . . . 794 A.2d 744 (2002), we 
acknowledged the State’s assertion that Claremont School District v. Governor, . . . 703 
A.2d 1353 (1997) (Claremont II) issued “four mandates: define an adequate education, de-
termine the cost, fund it with constitutional taxes, and ensure its delivery through account-
ability,” and that these four mandates comprise the State's duty to provide an adequate edu-
cation. 
Id. 
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ple, in 1817 in the famous Dartmouth College case,170 the court said so 
emphatically: 
I am aware that this power in the hands of the legislature may, like 
every other power, at times be unwisely exercised; but where can it 
be more securely lodged?  If those whom the people annually elect 
to manage their public affairs, cannot be trusted, who can?  The 
people have most emphatically enjoined it in the constitution, as a 
duty upon “the legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of 
the government, to cherish the interests of literature and the sci-
ences and all seminaries and public schools.”  And those interests 
will be cherished, both by the legislature and the people, so long as 
there is virtue enough left to maintain the rest of our institutions.  
Whenever the people and their rulers shall become corrupt enough 
to wage war with the sciences and liberal arts, we may be assured 
that the time will have arrived, when all our institutions, our laws, 
our liberties must pass away,—when all that can be dear to free-
men, or that can make their country dear to them, must be lost, and 
when a government and institutions must be established, of a very 
different character from those under which it is our pride and our 
happiness to live.171 
In 1936, the court made the same point, albeit with far less flourish: 
“Any educational policy or rule declared by the Legislature or promulgated 
under authority delegated by it may not be reversed or vacated judicially 
on the ground that it must be regarded as impolitic.”172  In 1958, the court 
said, “the manner in which educational policy of cities shall be formulated 
is determined by their Legislature and not the courts.”173  A case decided 
by the court in 1971 involved as its “principal issue . . . whether the Laco-
nia School Board may compel the city to appropriate funds for services and 
programs that in the judgment of the school board exercised in good faith 
are essential to an adequate educational system.”174  Yet the decision no-
where mentions Article 83.175 
  
 170. The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, where the Great Chief Justice, John 
Marshall, wrote an opinion for the Court famously holding that the charter incorporating Dartmouth 
College was a contract protected by the United States Constitution from legislative modification.  Trs. 
of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
 171. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111, 137 (1817). 
 172. Coleman v. Sch. Dist. of Rochester, 183 A. 586, 589 (N.H. 1936). 
 173. City of Franklin v. Hinds, 143 A.2d 111, 113 (N.H. 1958).  
 174. Laconia Bd. of Educ. v. City of Laconia, 285 A.2d 793, 794 (N.H. 1971). 
 175. See id. 
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C. Conclusion  
Given the importance of education to the founding generation and the 
nearly contemporaneous passage of the law of 1789, one can argue that the 
original understanding of Article 83’s duty to cherish the interest of public 
schools was that the representative branches were required to establish 
some system of public schools.  On the other hand, the text of Article 83 
suggests that even this may be going too far because it would be quite pe-
culiar to include a single mandate in a lengthy enumeration of exhortations.   
What is not arguable, however, and what matters is that there is no tex-
tual or historical support for the proposition that Article 83 was understood 
to mandate any qualitative standard of education or quantifiable level of 
state financial support.  
It is incontestable that Article 83 contains no language establishing 
qualitative educational standards or quantifiable funding levels.  Hence, it 
can only be read to leave these matters to the discretion of the “[l]egislators 
and magistrates” charged with effectuating the duty to cherish the interest 
of public schools.176  Reading Article 83 in a different manner also would 
be inconsistent with the nature of the constitution’s grants of the powers to 
make laws, raise taxes, and spend money, which leaves the exercise of 
these powers to the discretion of the representative branches.  Turning to 
history, the funding system under the law of 1789, which lasted until 1919, 
is just the opposite of what one would expect if Article 83 had been under-
stood to mandate “adequate funding,”177 let alone the “comparable fund-
ing” that the court in Claremont II described as “basic” to the concept of 
adequacy.178   
In sum, the language of the constitution and the historical record indi-
cate that the voters who adopted Article 83 did not understand it to give 
rise to the sort of duty to provide and fund an adequate education fashioned 
in the Claremont decisions. 
IV.  CLAREMONT AND STARE DECISIS  
Because Claremont is not a correct interpretation of the constitution, 
the question becomes whether it is protected by stare decisis.  In consider-
ing Claremont and stare decisis, the salient consideration is that stare de-
cisis “is at its weakest” where a court “interpret[s] the Constitution because 
[its] interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by 
  
 176. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83. 
 177. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 635 A.2d 1375, 1376 (N.H. 1993).   
 178. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1360 (N.H. 1997).   
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overruling [its] prior decisions.”179  Probably the most well known and 
celebrated example of a court rejecting stare decisis is the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which overruled an in-
terpretation of the federal constitution that was more than half a century 
old.180   
The constitutional stakes raised by Claremont are especially high be-
cause Claremont is obviously an incorrect interpretation of Article 83 and 
because Claremont represents a manifest violation of the separation of 
powers principle which is the foundation of our system of government.  In 
contrast, not much of a case can be made that Claremont has proven 
workable or that it has resulted in any reliance interests.181 
Despite nearly a decade having passed between Claremont II and Lon-
donderry I, it apparently remained “impossible for school districts, parents, 
and courts, not to mention the legislative and executive branches them-
selves, to know where the state’s obligations to fund the cost of a constitu-
tionally adequate education begin and end.”182  This track record strongly 
suggests that the Claremont decisions are unworkable.  While the court and 
the proponents of Claremont would lay the blame squarely on the repre-
  
 179. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997).  See Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 638 
A.2d 1246, 1248 (N.H. 1994) (stating that “considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in 
cases involving contract rights, where reliance interests are involved”) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted).  Some scholars have argued that it is inappropriate to ever apply stare decisis to preserve an 
erroneous precedent when a constitution is involved: 
Suppose now that a court is faced with a conflict between the Constitution on the one hand 
and a prior judicial decision on the other.  Is there any doubt that, under the reasoning of 
Marbury, the court must choose the Constitution over the prior decision?  If a statute, en-
acted with all of the majestic formalities for lawmaking prescribed by the Constitution, and 
stamped with the imprimatur of representative democracy, cannot legitimately be given ef-
fect in an adjudication when it conflicts with the Constitution, how can a mere judicial deci-
sion possibly have a greater legal status?  If the Constitution says X and a prior judicial de-
cision says Y, a court has not merely the power, but the obligation, to prefer the Constitu-
tion.  Furthermore, if courts must search for the true meaning of the Constitution, rather than 
the meaning ascribed to it by the Congress or the President, there is no apparent reason why 
they must not also prefer the document's true meaning to the meaning ascribed to it by a 
precedent court. 
Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 27−28 
(1994); see also Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent and the Constitution: Some Originalist and 
Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 
CONST. COMMENT. 311, 315 (2005) (arguing “an obligation on the part of the Court to defer to the 
political branches on the question of when a precedent is causing more harm than good . . . .”). 
 180. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (overruling the “separate but 
equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); see also W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 
300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)); Boul-
ders at Strafford, LLC v. Town of Strafford, 903 A.2d 1021, 1029 (N.H. 2006) (overruling, in part, 
Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 374 A.2d 954 (N.H. 1977) and Powers v. Town of Hampton, 480 A.2d 
143 (N.H. 1984)). 
 181. See Scanlon, 638 A.2d at 1248 (stating factors favoring application of stare decisis are reliance 
and workability of decision). 
 182. Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU # 12 v. State (Londonderry I), 907 A.2d 988, 994 (N.H. 2006). 
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sentative branches, on the ground that they failed to properly effectuate the 
mandates of Claremont II,183 ironically such criticism proves the point.  A 
court decision that imposes an affirmative duty on the representative 
branches to pass certain types of laws or raise a certain amount of taxes is 
inherently unworkable if the representative branches see their constitu-
tional duties differently, or would rather face the court’s displeasure rather 
than the voters’ displeasure.184 
Even if the court were to follow through on its unfortunate suggestion 
in Londonderry I, that it may and would “take further action to enforce the 
mandates of Part II, Article 83,” in the absence of what it deems satisfac-
tory action by the representative branches,185 Claremont would remain 
unworkable.  The “appropriate remedies” threatened by the court were:  
(1) invalidating the funding mechanism established in House Bill 
616 as set forth in the concurring opinion of Justice Galway; (2) 
appointing a special master to aid in the definition of a constitu-
tionally adequate education, . . . or (3) implementing the remedy 
outlined in the concurring opinion of Justice Duggan and remand-
ing the case to the trial court “for further factual development and 
a determination of whether the State is providing sufficient fund-
ing to pay for a constitutionally adequate education.”186 
Striking down the funding system created by House Bill 616 would be 
an effective remedy only to the extent that the representative branches re-
sponded to that threat by defining an adequate education within the court’s 
deadline.187  Otherwise, this remedy would result in there being no funding 
at all for public education, which is a decidedly odd remedy if the disease 
to be cured is an inadequate education.  While this approach worked in 
Claremont II—the representative branches eventually enacted a statewide 
property tax when the court struck down the extant funding system but 
  
 183. These “mandates” are: “define an adequate education, determine the cost, fund it with constitu-
tional taxes, and ensure its delivery through accountability.”  Id. at 990 (internal citation and quotation 
omitted). 
 184. This aspect of Claremont shows just how prescient James Madison was when he wrote that “the 
great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in 
giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal mo-
tives to resist encroachments of the others.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 185. Londonderry I, 907 A.2d at 995. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. (“As to the core definitional issues, we will retain jurisdiction with the expectation that 
the political branches will define with specificity the components of a constitutionally adequate educa-
tion before the end of fiscal year 2007.”) 
File: Mosca - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 2 Created on:  12/6/2007 4:35:00 PM Last Printed: 12/7/2007 9:26:00 AM 
242 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 2 
 
allowed it to “remain in effect through the 1988 tax year”188—there is no 
guarantee that future legislatures and governors will be as compliant. 
Having a special master or a trial judge determine what an adequate 
education is and costs is an effective remedy only to the extent that the 
special master or the trial judge can actually make such a determination 
and that the representative branches then deliver that education and raise 
the concomitant taxes.  The proposition that the judiciary can develop and 
maintain a better system of public education than the representative 
branches is untenable. 
The judiciary is the branch least institutionally suited to setting educa-
tion policy and budgets.  It must wait for the appropriate lawsuit to set 
education policy.  The legislature, in contrast, is able to change education 
policy as often as necessary.  Judges have no special training in setting 
education policy or budgets, and far less regular exposure than elected of-
ficials to the conditions in the public schools.  Compounding these prob-
lems, a special master or trial judge setting education policy and budgets 
will have a far narrower perspective to consider than elected officials.  The 
special master or trial judge will get to hear only from the litigants’ “expert 
witnesses.”  Legislative bodies, in contrast, can listen to anyone who might 
be helpful.  Most importantly, unlike elected officials, judges in New 
Hampshire are unaccountable to those affected by their decisions.  In sum, 
having a special master or a trial judge determine what an adequate educa-
tion is and costs could well result in public school students receiving a less 
adequate education than what they would have received from the represen-
tative branches. 
Even if a special master or a trial judge could determine what an ade-
quate education is and costs, the question remains whether the representa-
tive branches will deliver that education and raise the concomitant taxes.  
While the representative branches in other states have complied when their 
supreme courts ordered them to increase education spending by a certain 
amount,189 there is no guarantee that New Hampshire legislatures and gov-
ernors will be as compliant.190 
  
 188. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1360 (N.H. 1997).  And, since 
I wrote this article, this also worked in Londonderry I as the representative branches enacted a defini-
tion to the plaintiffs’ liking. 
 189. See Eugene Van Loan, Judicial Review and Its Limits, 47 N.H.B.J. 52, 52–53 (2006) (discussing 
Supreme Court of Kansas’ Montoy v. Kansas decision, in which “the court ordered the Kansas Legisla-
ture to immediately raise another $143 million to support education—or else”). 
 190. What makes New Hampshire sui generis in this regard is that the state has neither an income tax 
nor a sales tax, but compliance with the “mandate” that the entire cost of an adequate education be 
funded with state taxes may necessitate such a tax.  See DOUGLAS E. HALL, SCHOOL FINANCE 
REFORM: BASIC FACTS & ESTIMATES 2000 ISSUE (2000), available at http://www.nhpolicy.org/ educa-
tion/facts00.html (estimating 3.25% income tax required to raise $825 million). 
File: Mosca - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 2 Created on: 12/6/2007 4:35:00 PM Last Printed: 12/7/2007 9:26:00 AM 
2007 NEW HAMPSHIRE CONSTITUTION'S EDUCATION CLAUSE 243 
 
Turning to whether the Claremont cases have resulted in any reliance 
interests, it is questionable whether anybody would be harmed if the 
Claremont cases were overruled because there is no evidence that Clare-
mont has improved the quality of public education. 
In sum, the benefits of overruling the Claremont cases—the correction 
of an obviously incorrect constitutional interpretation and bringing state 
government back into line with the separation of powers principle—
overwhelmingly outweigh any costs. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The founding generation viewed public education as essential to pre-
serving the republican governments they established after breaking from 
England.191  This view can be seen throughout the writings of John Adams.   
In 1765, Adams observed that “wherever a general knowledge and 
sensibility have prevailed among the people, arbitrary government and 
every kind of oppression have lessened and disappeared in proportion.”192  
In 1787, he recommended the following:  
Children should be educated and instructed in the principles of 
freedom.  Aristotle speaks plainly to this purpose, saying, “that the 
institution of youth should be accommodated to that form of gov-
ernment under which they live; forasmuch as it makes exceedingly 
for the preservation of the present government, whatsoever it 
be.”193   
Other giants of the founding generation expressed similar views.  For 
example, Thomas Jefferson, in the preamble to the Bill for the More Gen-
eral Diffusion of Knowledge, which was introduced to the Virginia legisla-
  
 191. LORRAINE SMITH PANGLE & THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE LEARNING OF LIBERTY 1 (1993).  Pangle 
stated: 
The classic account of the reasons for the instability of republican government focused on 
education as the heart of the problem.  Republics, it was argued, require an extraordinary 
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(1969); M.H. Hoeflich, Law in the Republican Classroom, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 711, 713 (1995) (Foun-
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can and republican culture and the transmission of this culture to the youth of the new nation.  They 
understood thoroughly that the time to shape attitudes and opinions is youth.”). 
 192. John Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, in THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS 
OF JOHN ADAMS 21 (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000). 
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ture in 1779, argued that public education was the best safeguard against 
governmental overreaching:  
[T]hat even under the best forms, those entrusted with power have, 
in time, and by slow operations, perverted it into tyranny; and it is 
believed that the most effectual means of preventing this would be, 
to illuminate, as far as practicable, the minds of the people at large, 
and more especially to give them knowledge of those facts, which 
history exhibiteth, that, possessed thereby of the experience of 
other ages and countries, they may be enabled to know ambition 
under all its shapes, and prompt to exert their natural powers to de-
feat its purposes . . . .194 
Benjamin Franklin argued for the institution of a school in his home city of 
Philadelphia in order to promote good government: 
[A]s might supply the succeeding Age with Men qualified to serve 
the Publick with Honour to themselves, and to their Country . . . 
(and who would learn) the Advantages of Civil Orders and Consti-
tutions . . . the Advantages of Liberty, Mischiefs of Licentiousness, 
Benefits arising from good Laws and a due Execution of Justice.195 
The same perspective prevailed in New Hampshire.  In 1792, Gover-
nor Josiah Bartlett stated to the legislature: 
Every regulation that will have a tendency to diffuse knowledge 
and information, and to encourage virtue, morality & patriotism 
among the people, especially among the Youth and rising genera-
tion, cannot fail of being abundantly useful and beneficial to the 
State, as it is a maxim well established “That no Republic can be 
lasting and happy unless accompanied with Knowledge and public 
virtue in the People at large.”196 
In 1792, the historian Jeremy Belknap admonished that teachers should, 
“teach by their example as well as by their precepts; that they govern them-
selves, and teach their pupils the art of felf-government [sic].”197  An 1827 
law enjoined teachers 
to take diligent care, and use their best endeavors, to impress on 
the minds of children and youth committed to their care and in-
  
 194. PANGLE & PANGLE, supra note 191, at 107.   
 195. Hoeflich, supra note 191, at 713 (quoting Benjamin Franklin, Proposals Relating to the Educa-
tion of Youth in Pennsylvania, in 3 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 392−413 (Leonard W. La-
baree et al. eds., 1961)). 
 196. THE PAPERS OF JOSIAH BARTLETT 385−86 (Frank Meyers ed., 1979). 
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struction, the principles of piety and justice, and a sacred regard to 
truth, love of their country, humanity and benevolence; sobriety, 
industry and frugality; chastity, moderation and temperance; and 
all other virtues which are the ornaments of a human society.  And 
it shall be the duty of such instructors, to endeavor to lead those 
under their care into a particular understanding of the tendency of 
the before mentioned virtues to preserve and perfect a republican 
form of government, and to secure the blessings of liberty, as well 
as to promote their future happiness; and the tendency of the oppo-
site vices to slavery and ruin.198 
In an address to the New Hampshire Historical Society in 1833, Nathaniel 
Bouton stated: 
New England owes her intellectual and moral glory to her religion, 
secondarily to her schools.  Although, then, we cannot compete 
with our bretheren of the middle and western States in the gigantic 
race of wealth, population and internal improvements; yet we may 
retain our preeminence in education and in moral and religious 
character. 
Need I add, it is the soundest policy of the State to encourage 
education?  That this is, at once, an effective check to crime and 
barrier to pauperism?  That it inspires noble sentiments—holds 
under restraint the baser passion;—ennobles virtue and is one 
guarantee of the permanence of our republican institutions?199 
The irony of the Claremont decisions, then, is that the court, in the 
name of effectuating Article 83’s duty to cherish the interest of public 
schools, has engaged in the very sort of governmental overreaching that the 
state’s founders hoped to thwart by “spreading the opportunities and ad-
vantages of education through the various parts of the country.”200 
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